A new study, published in Perspectives on Terrorism, looks at how militant groups manage trade-offs between logistical needs and ideological commitments, diving into the complex balancing act militant groups face in managing their strategic and ideological resources, and how this impacts their violent activities.
The research paper, titled, “Balancing Act: How Militant Groups Manage Strategic and Ideological Resources,” outlines two main schools of thought in relation to the victimization of civilians by militant groups. First, the rational choice perspective, with strategic objectives being the primary motivation behind violence. Second, psychological or ideological factors based around sacred values and deep-seated beliefs.
The study suggests that decision-makers in militant groups often go back and forth between rational and psychological, before eventually focusing on one: ideological resources, such as the mission and convictions that spur the group; or logistical, which include funding, membership, decision-making structures, and material resource management.
The authors of the study have come up with a classification, identifying four group types based on the level of influence from either ideological or logistical resources and the degree of violence against civilians. They validated their proposal by examining extreme cases involving the United States-based Weather Underground Organization (WUO); al-Qaida in Iraq; Mexico’s Autodefensas; and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone.
The four types of militant group are:
- Violent Militants – Heavily prioritize ideology and exhibit high levels of violence against civilians.
- Militant Opportunists – Focus on logistical needs and engage in opportunistic violence.
- Professional Militants – Balance both resources effectively and use targeted violence.
- Disciplined Militants – Prioritize ideology with strict control, resulting in lower levels of civilian violence.
The research finds that the level of violence perpetrated against civilians by these groups is heavily influenced by the alignment of ideological and logistical priorities of their leaders.
As an example, the study points to the WUO, who maintain a commitment to civilian violence through tightened membership control; and al-Qaida, who under al-Zarqawi, created a salary system aimed at deterring opportunists and balancing logistical constraints with strategic violence.
Adding to this, the study notes that, as these organizations grow, their structures may evolve, which may affect recruitment and community relationships. Citing how weakening support from locals led to the RUF’s eventual downfall, as the group became more violent and less ideologically coherent.
