Natural disasters would seem to be an equal opportunity menace, indifferent to the economic or social status of the victims unfortunate enough to be in proximity to them. Certainly the sight of wildfires consuming multi-million dollar mansions in Southern California amply demonstrates that the rich are hardly immune from nature.

Nonetheless the negative impacts of large-scale natural catastrophes often fall disproportionately on the poorest members of communities. In a seminal essay Disaster Law and Inequality published last year Daniel A. Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law; Director, Environmental Law Program at the University of California at Berkeley, and a pioneer in the emerging field of Disaster Law, wrote, “The relationship between disasters and societal disadvantage deserves further study from social scientists. Current research on the subject is patchy. But what we know at this point is enough to indicate clearly that race and poverty, along with age and gender, make a significant difference. Those who already suffer from societal disadvantage are more likely to be in harm’s way, and they are less likely to be able to take defensive action or to reconstruct their lives after a disaster.” Click here to see full essay

A vivid illustration of this grim reality can be seen in a new study released yesterday on the costs of the major floods which ravaged Iowa in June by the Iowa Fiscal Partnership. Click here to see report.

“The profound effects of the summer floods on many households, businesses, towns and farmlands have rippled across Iowa’s overall economy, placing new responsibilities on state government for both immediate relief and long-term rebuilding,” begins the report, entitled Flooding in Iowa: A Responsible Response.

Though it’s been over two months since the floods receded, “the full impact of the flood is only beginning to emerge,” according to the report. As a fuller picture of the extent of social, economic and physical damage does get fleshed out, however, it’s becoming clear, the report says, drawing upon census block group data and maps of the flooded area of Cedar Rapids, that those most directly and deeply affected by flooding in Cedar Rapids live and work in areas that are substantially poorer than most of their community and the state.

As the report notes, “Early reports indicated as many as 25,000 Cedar Rapids residents were evacuated and 7,000 residents had their homes flooded. However, it is likely that at least 1 in 10 Cedar Rapids residents, over 12,000 in all – as well as most downtown businesses and commercial areas – were actual flood victims. This includes over 3,000 children, two-thirds of whom are school-aged, many needing to adjust to new schools, classrooms and classmates when school commences this fall.”

Poverty rates in the flooded areas, the report found, were more than double that of the county as a whole (104 percent higher), and substantially higher than that for the state (47 percent higher). Consistent with county and state data, child poverty rates were significantly above poverty rates for the population as a whole, with over 1 in 7 children affected by the flood living under the poverty level (about $16,700 for a family of four, 1999).

The flooded area, according to the report, also had a much higher relative share of Cedar Rapids’ and Linn County’s African-American, Hispanic and other minority populations. Overall, 12.4 percent of the residents in the flooded areas were minorities (not white, non-Hispanic), compared with 6.9 percent of Linn County residents and 7.4 percent of the Iowa population.

Realization of the disproportionate damage faced by the poor in natural disasters has, the report’s authors believe, important strategic and tactical implications not only specifically for Iowa but for emergency planning, mitigation and recovery more broadly.

The first major “lesson learned” according to the report is that damage assessments need to take into account the communities and populations most at risk in the disaster and its aftermath. In particular, it says, targeting is key. In its words, “Rebuilding efforts need to be focused upon those impacted by the disaster, with a particular emphasis upon those for whom rebuilding will be most problematic (low-income and limited resource families).” Further, it says,“Rebuilding efforts need to involve those impacted in the planning and, to the extent possible, make use of their own skills and talents in rebuilding.

In addition to focused targeting the report urges that relief efforts geared to low income populations be timely. “Focused relief efforts,” it explains, “ need to occur when people are experiencing the disruptions and have immediate need for relief (recognizing the phases that families are likely to experience in dealing with loss). They should target relief at those affected by the flood, and those whose property value was damaged the most and who have the least available means to address the damage themselves should get the most relief.”

The report criticizes one common mitigation strategy proposed in the wake of many disasters, property tax rebates. “Proposals to grant property tax forgiveness,” it says,” would be nearly impossible to administer in a manner that truly based relief on need (as well as only touching on the relief some families do need to rebuild their lives),” it argues. “Consider two homeowners, Fred and Martha, who each own a home worth $150,000 that was flooded,” it adds. “Fred has no flood insurance, the home was heavily damaged, and he cannot occupy it until major renovations occur, if at all. Martha’s home sustained relatively minor damage, but she was insured and the home will be repaired by October and reoccupied. Fred suffered a $150,000 loss, Martha no financial loss on the home itself. It makes no sense to provide both with the same public aid in the amount of one year’s property taxes, yet it would be very difficult to structure a property tax relief provision that distinguished between these two homeowners or recognized the many gradations that would come in between. This is neither a fair nor effective way of targeting limited funds in a way that will promote rebuilding.”

“ Furthermore,” it adds, “ property tax relief does nothing to help the many renters who had no wealth in the form of a home to lose, but who nonetheless lost all of their possessions. In some if not most flooded areas, renters outnumber homeowners.”

Finally, the report recommends that disaster recovery efforts should be project-based according to strict time lines. “Rebuilding efforts will take years,” the report concludes, “but most should be time-limited to the initial rebuilding and should not be permanent. Recovering from this disaster should not become an excuse for adopting every tax incentive or economic development grant program that was not able to stand on its own merits in the past. These are extraordinary times, and any extraordinary efforts that are necessary for rebuilding should be designed as time-limited. In particular, they should not be framed as responding to a disaster and then made a permanent part of either public funding or tax policy.

A corollary of this principle is that “the use of public funds for rebuilding must be held to clearly defined and transparent accountability standards that further Iowa’s goals. Time-specific goals, objectives and benchmarks should be established for any publicly financed rebuilding incentives and assistance. Recipients of incentives should be held accountable to meet these standards; if standards are not met, recipients should be responsible for repaying the assistance provided.”

Consideration of economic class has been generally a neglected topic in discussions of emergency management. This report usefully reminds us, though, that a true assessment of the costs and consequences, social as well as economic, of natural catastrophes needs to address this heretofore hidden dimension.