A congressional mandate to scan 100 percent of all shipping containers coming into US ports for nuclear or other harmful material is simply unrealistic and "not a wise investment of taxpayer dollars." The technology doesn't yet exist to sufficiently scan all cargo without drastically disrupting port operations. A better plan is to require all cargo from certain "high-risk" countries to be scanned, instead of placing a huge economic burden on the world's port systems.

Those were just a few of the arguments Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Deputy Commissioner Jayson Ahern gave lawmakers Thursday for why the administration will not meet Congress' 2012 deadline for 100 percent scanning of US-bound cargo from more than 700 foreign seaports.

"No one should be misled to believe that 100 percent scanning … is going to present 100 percent security," Ahern said during a hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation's Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and Security.

"With 32 years of experience, my biggest concern is we're focusing on the maritime environment" when there are far greater risks to other areas, such as rail and border security, where money, resources and time could be better spent reinforcing, Ahern said.

But it's simply unacceptable that the US can spend about a half-trillion dollars on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet it can't spend money to meet that 2012 deadline, argued panel chairman, Sen. Frank Lautenberg, D-NJ. And, it's unfathomable that with the technological prowess of the US, the administration is now saying the technology simply isn't there.

"If this was a brain operation and the doctor said, 'well I didn't know I had to have a particular type of tool,' 'I didn't know we used a particular type of anesthesia,'" that would be unacceptable, Lautenberg said. Same goes for cargo security.

David Huizenga, an assistant deputy administrator at the National Nuclear Security Administration, said the government has been working with industry to produce technology needed for port-appropriate scanning systems that don't interfere with operations.

"Despite our best efforts, there are some things that can't be done and keep the port operating," Huizenga lamented. "It's a simple logistics issue, really."

There's also a need for more advanced automatic anomaly-detection systems that would alleviate the need for trained human personnel to review and analyze scan data.

The administration says the maritime and cargo security system includes a "layered" approach that encompasses the Sept. 11 Commission recommendations, and other programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) - which installed CBP personnel at foreign seaports to use intelligence and risk assessments to determine whether US-bound shipments may contain WMD or other contraband - and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, where trade companies voluntarily develop security profiles of themselves to reduce and speed up their shipment inspections.

Lautenberg said a more appropriate characterization of CBP’s approach is "piece-meal."

"After the 9/11 attacks, the federal government installed equipment to scan 100 percent of passengers and baggage boarding a plane," Lautenberg said. "It should not take another attack on our country for the federal government to secure our ports."

To comply with the varying mandates, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), and has initiated pilot programs at seven foreign seaports.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported at the hearing that it identified nine challenge areas related to SFI and the 100 percent scanning requirement. They include:

• Workforce planning;
• Host nation examination practices;
• Measuring performance of program;
• Resource (cost) responsibilities;
• Logistics of space constraints at ports;
• Technology and infrastructure;
• Use and ownership of data when foreign seaports are involved;
• Consistency with risk management; and
• Reciprocity and trade concerns

CBP recently submitted a report to Congress on the pilot programs in Honduras, Pakistan, the UK, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Oman. The total US-bound container volume from these ports from Oct. 12, 2007 to Feb. 12, 2007, was 51,937 containers.

CBP says the pilots have demonstrated that complete scanning is possible on a limited scale in low-volume ports processing primary port gate traffic. A large problem is transshipped containers delivered to the port from the waterside that do not pass through the land SFI scanning systems. But expense for these systems are so great, CBP said money would be better spent on high-risk ports. Ahern estimated costs to reach about $8 million per lane at each port. Hong Kong's port, for example, has ten lanes.

Twenty-seven countries, nine international trade organizations, and other groups have written to the US with concern that the mandate will put undue burden on their ports and their pockets, Ahern said. It will also negatively impact the trucking, rail, and other industries, leaving a much bigger footprint than anticipated, he added.

"There's been quite a lot of complaints about this," said Stephen Caldwell, director of homeland security and justice issues at GAO.

"The consequences are out there and looming large," Ahern added.

But Lautenberg wasn't convinced. He told Ahern he expects CBP to prepare a report for the public on the reasons why the administration can't meet the task at hand, and what it needs to get it done.

"There's something here that I think would be of significant public interest," Lautenberg said.

Liza Porteus Viana is HSToday.us's New York Correspondent. She wrote the June 2008 HSToday cover story, "Bracing for a Northern Punch."

Editor’s Note: HSToday.us recently re-examined the on-going security threat posed by misdeclared and mislabeled ship cargo - a security risk top maritime authorities say CBP cargo security programs aren’t designed to catch. HSToday.us also earlier explored the pros and cons of 100 percent ship cargo scanning.